On the 6th August Brigadier Copper and his 29th Brigade were detached from General Mahon's 10th Irish and sent to reinforce the ANZACs at Anzac Cove wher, after landing, they met with further subdivision going into action as isolated units. General Mahon would later write that his Irishmen had to fight ' under officers that did not know them ' which was ' damaging to an Irish formation where officers and men traditionally struck up close ties of personal loyalty ' It was also a great disappointment that they were not to fight as a division, considering their high hopes and the hopes of those at home that these Irishmen were fighting for the honour of Ireland as the first Irish Division ever to do so. One may wonder if the decision was more political and deliberate and that those higher up did not wish to see the division prove themselves and make their mark in the Campain. Historian Myles Dungan suggests that the 10th ( Irish )
' suffered more than most . . never fighting as a single unit . . at one point operating under three seperate commanders. '
' suffered more than most . . never fighting as a single unit . . at one point operating under three seperate commanders. '
Gallipoli
Galway born, General Sir Bryan Mahon Brigadier Cooper, 29th Brigade
The 10th Irish Division would suffer terribly at Gallipoli with almost 2,000 men losing their lives. They fought bravely and with great determination as we will see. But the Turks were not the only thing going against the Irish boys: the intense heat, inadequate medical assistance, and poor military command and strategy all played their part too. The Division was eventually pulled out of Gallipoli in the summer of 1915 with the men depleted in both numbers and morale.
The Division moved to Mudros, and on the 4-5th October went on to Salonika, landing there 5-10th October. It took part on the 7th and 8th December 1915 in the action at Kosturino, in the retreat from Serbia. Brigades of the Division were in action at the Karajakois ( 30th September to 2nd October 1915 ) and Yenikoi ( 3-4th October 1915 ) Salonika.
On the 18th August 1917, the Division was ordered to concentrate at the port of Salonika for embarkation. Early in September it moved to Egypt, completing assembly near Rafa by the 16th October 1917. The Division was involved in the Palestine Campaign thereafter. Between April and June 1918, a major reorganisation took place as many British units were replaced by Indian ones.
On 12th November 1918 the Division concentrated at Sarafand, ready for moving back to Egypt. By the 1st December it was at Cairo.
From 1915 to 1918 the 10th ( Irish ) Division suffered a total of 9,363 officers and men killed, wounded, or missing in action.
The Division moved to Mudros, and on the 4-5th October went on to Salonika, landing there 5-10th October. It took part on the 7th and 8th December 1915 in the action at Kosturino, in the retreat from Serbia. Brigades of the Division were in action at the Karajakois ( 30th September to 2nd October 1915 ) and Yenikoi ( 3-4th October 1915 ) Salonika.
On the 18th August 1917, the Division was ordered to concentrate at the port of Salonika for embarkation. Early in September it moved to Egypt, completing assembly near Rafa by the 16th October 1917. The Division was involved in the Palestine Campaign thereafter. Between April and June 1918, a major reorganisation took place as many British units were replaced by Indian ones.
On 12th November 1918 the Division concentrated at Sarafand, ready for moving back to Egypt. By the 1st December it was at Cairo.
From 1915 to 1918 the 10th ( Irish ) Division suffered a total of 9,363 officers and men killed, wounded, or missing in action.
The Suvla Bay Landing
( Continued )
On the 7th June 1915, the Dardanelles Committee met in London and, under the guidance of Lord Kitchener, decided to reinforce the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force of General Sir Ian Hamilton with three New Army Divisions. Two more Territorial Army Divisions were allocated later in the month, giving Hamilton the numbers required to reinvigorate the campaign. A long standing plan to break out of the Anzac bridgehead was adopted: it had first been proposed on the 30th May by the commander of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, Lieutenant-General William Birdwood.
However, just as the original landing site at Helles in April had insufficient space to land all the troops available, and so a secondary landing was to be made north of Gaba Tepe, now in July there was insufficient room to accommodate all the new troops within the congested Anzac perimeter, nor was there room to manoeuvre them in battle, and so a new landing at Suvla was planned which would link up with the forces at Anzac. The Suvla landing was made by the newly formed British IX Corps, initially comprising two brigades of the 10th ( Irish ) Division and the entire 11th ( Northern ) Division. Command of IX Corps was given to Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick Stopford. British military historian J.F.C Fuller said of Stopford that he had " no conception of what generalship meant " but was this not the case with most of the British Staff who were bringing their ' Sudan and Boer War ' tactics onto a modern battlefield? Stopford was appointed not on his experience, or his energy and enthusiasm, but because of his position on the list of seniority. Hamilton had requested either Lieutenatnt-General Julian Byng or Lieutenant-General Henry Rawlinson, both experienced Western Front Corps Commanders, but both were junior to Lieutenant-General Sir Bryan Mahon, commander of the 10th ( Irish ) Division, and so, by a process of elimination, Stopford was selected.
However, just as the original landing site at Helles in April had insufficient space to land all the troops available, and so a secondary landing was to be made north of Gaba Tepe, now in July there was insufficient room to accommodate all the new troops within the congested Anzac perimeter, nor was there room to manoeuvre them in battle, and so a new landing at Suvla was planned which would link up with the forces at Anzac. The Suvla landing was made by the newly formed British IX Corps, initially comprising two brigades of the 10th ( Irish ) Division and the entire 11th ( Northern ) Division. Command of IX Corps was given to Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick Stopford. British military historian J.F.C Fuller said of Stopford that he had " no conception of what generalship meant " but was this not the case with most of the British Staff who were bringing their ' Sudan and Boer War ' tactics onto a modern battlefield? Stopford was appointed not on his experience, or his energy and enthusiasm, but because of his position on the list of seniority. Hamilton had requested either Lieutenatnt-General Julian Byng or Lieutenant-General Henry Rawlinson, both experienced Western Front Corps Commanders, but both were junior to Lieutenant-General Sir Bryan Mahon, commander of the 10th ( Irish ) Division, and so, by a process of elimination, Stopford was selected.
Planning
The offensive was to open on the 6th August 1915, with diversions at Helles ( the Battle of Krithia Vineyard)
and Anzac ( the Battle of Lone Pine ) The landing at Suvla was to commence at 10:10pm an hour after the two assaulting columns had broken out of Anzac heading for the Sari Bair heights. The original plan at Suvla was to put the 11th Division ashore south of Nibrunesi Point, the southern headland of the bay, as it was not considered safe to land in the dark within the bay itself where there were uncharted shoals. The 30th and 31st Brigades of the 10th ( Irish Division ) would land the following morning. The Objective of IX Corps was to seize the ring of hills that surrounded the Suvla plain; Kiretch Tepe to the north along the Gulf of Saros, Tekke Tepe to the east and the Anafarta Spur to the south-east.
When Stopford was first shown the plan on the 22nd July he declared " It is a good plan. I am sure it will succeed and i congratulate whoever has been responsible for framing it. " Stopford's Chief-of-Staff, Brigadier General Hamilton Reed was not so supportive and his doubts and predjudices succeeded in swaying Stopford. Reed was an artillery officer who had won the Victoria Cross during the Boer War. Having served on the Western front, he believed no assault on entrenched positions could be made without artillery support. Reconnaissance had revealed no prepared fortifications at Suvla and yet Stopford proceeded to limit the objectives of the landing and Hamilton failed to stop him. The final orders issued by Stopford and the 11th Division commander, Major General Frederick Hammersley, were imprecise, requiring only the high ground to be taken ' if possible '
Stopford and Reed also wanted the 34th Brigade of the 11th Division to be landed within Suvla Bay itself. Unlike the April landings, IX Corps was supplied with purpose built landing craft known as ' Beetles ' which were armoured and self-propelled. The fleet of landing craft was commanded by Commander Edward Unwin who had captained the SS River Clyde during the April landing on V Beach at Cape Helles.
The commander of the Fifth Army, General Otto Liman von Sanders, was well aware a new landing was imminent through reports of troop build-ups in the Greek isalnds, however he was unsure of where the landing would be made.
and Anzac ( the Battle of Lone Pine ) The landing at Suvla was to commence at 10:10pm an hour after the two assaulting columns had broken out of Anzac heading for the Sari Bair heights. The original plan at Suvla was to put the 11th Division ashore south of Nibrunesi Point, the southern headland of the bay, as it was not considered safe to land in the dark within the bay itself where there were uncharted shoals. The 30th and 31st Brigades of the 10th ( Irish Division ) would land the following morning. The Objective of IX Corps was to seize the ring of hills that surrounded the Suvla plain; Kiretch Tepe to the north along the Gulf of Saros, Tekke Tepe to the east and the Anafarta Spur to the south-east.
When Stopford was first shown the plan on the 22nd July he declared " It is a good plan. I am sure it will succeed and i congratulate whoever has been responsible for framing it. " Stopford's Chief-of-Staff, Brigadier General Hamilton Reed was not so supportive and his doubts and predjudices succeeded in swaying Stopford. Reed was an artillery officer who had won the Victoria Cross during the Boer War. Having served on the Western front, he believed no assault on entrenched positions could be made without artillery support. Reconnaissance had revealed no prepared fortifications at Suvla and yet Stopford proceeded to limit the objectives of the landing and Hamilton failed to stop him. The final orders issued by Stopford and the 11th Division commander, Major General Frederick Hammersley, were imprecise, requiring only the high ground to be taken ' if possible '
Stopford and Reed also wanted the 34th Brigade of the 11th Division to be landed within Suvla Bay itself. Unlike the April landings, IX Corps was supplied with purpose built landing craft known as ' Beetles ' which were armoured and self-propelled. The fleet of landing craft was commanded by Commander Edward Unwin who had captained the SS River Clyde during the April landing on V Beach at Cape Helles.
The commander of the Fifth Army, General Otto Liman von Sanders, was well aware a new landing was imminent through reports of troop build-ups in the Greek isalnds, however he was unsure of where the landing would be made.
