the 29th division

The exhausted, demoralised and virtually leaderless British troops could go no further in the face off stiffening Turkish resistance. In places Turkish counter-attacks would drive the British back to their starting positions. By 6pm on April 28th the attack was called off.
13,500 Allied troops would paricipate in the battle, suffering 3,000 casualties. The scale and duration of the battle was minor compared to later fighting but the First Battle of Krithia was one of the most significant of the campaign as it proved that the original assumption of a swift victory over an indifferent enemy was grossly mistaken. Thereafter Helles would become the scene of numerous attrition battles and success would be measured by an advance of a hundred yards or the capure of a trench.

The Second Battle of Krithia

Following the failure of the First Battle of Krithia the exhausted soldiers of the British 29th Division halted to consolidate their positions. They had to endure a number of Turkish counter-attacks on May 1st and May 3rd. Similar counter-attacks were repulsed at the Anzac Landing on May 2nd so that General William Birdwood, commander of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps deemed his front sufficiently secure to enable two brigades to be moved to Helles for the next assault on Krithia. These were the Australian 2nd Infantry Brigade and the New Zealand Infantry Brigade. Meanwhile the Turks had also been reinforcing their defences around Krithia. Other British reinforcments included brigades from the Royal Naval Division and the 125th Brigade from the British 42nd ( East Lancashire ) Division. The 87th and 88th Brigades of the 29th Division ( including the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers ) would once again be at the forefront of the attack. The Anzac brigades and General Vaughn Cox's 29th Indian Brigade would be in reserve.

The commander at Helles Hunter-Weston was woefully lacking in shells for his artillery and those he did have were shrapnel shells which was ineffective against entrenched positions. The navy were somewhat ambitiously still hoarding shells for the anticipated assault on Constantinople.
while Cape Helles is more forgiving than the wild terrain at Anzac Cove the battlefield still presented difficulties to the attacking force. It was a major element the allies had over looked when planning the campaign. Soldiers who had landed in the earlier days were shocked to see the deep ravines and gullies when they had climbed the coastal cliffs and maps which were issued to officers were out of date. They gave no clue as to the type of terrain the battle would be fought over. The ground looked flat but was riven by four large gullies, or deres, running from Achi Baba towards the Cape. On the west was Gully Ravine which was seperated from the Aegean shore by Gully Spur. Moving east was Fir Tree Spur then Krithia Valley ( also known as Krithia Nullah or Kirte Dere ) then Krithia Spur then Kanli Dere, then Kereves Spur then Kereves Dere which flows into the Dardanelles at Monto Bay. Krithia Spur was bare and exposed so was not favoured for attacks. Gully Spur and Fir Tree Spur offered some cover and so the majority of the British advances were made on these spurs and in the shelter of the gullies.

The Plan

As with the first battle, the plan was for a general advance on a broad front across the peninsula. The attack was divided into three phases. The first phase involved a general advance of one mile acoss the entire front which would place the French on the right of the line, astride Kereves Spur where they were to dig in. In the second phase, the British in the centre and on the left would pivot on the French position and sweep up Fir Tree Spur and Gully Spur the capture Krithia village. The third phase would be to capture Achi Baba.
In the end, after three days of fighting, the Allies would abandon the battle without even completeting the first phase. In fact, the greatest advance achieved was a mere 600 yards.

The plan was made despite the fact that the British had no clear idea where the Turkish fortifications were. There was as yet no continuous system of trenches and aerial reconnaissance had failed to locate the defences. Consequently the preliminary bombardments that were made before each advance were utterly ineffectual. Hunter-Weston also insisted that the attacks be made in broad daylight, fearing that an attack under the cover of darkness would become confused. Having failed with this approach once during the first battle did not deter Hunter-Weston and as the second battle progressed he would remain undeterred.

The Battle

The allied advance began later than scheduled, around 11am, on May 6th but was swiftly halted by strong Turkish resistance. The 88th Brigade of the 29th Division advancing on Fir Tree Spur managed to capture Fir Tree Wood and the 6th ( Hood ) Battalion of the British 63rd ( Royal Naval ) Division advanced strongly along Kanli Dere but at all points of the line the gains were never more than 400 yards. At no point were the Turkish defences reached.
The attack was resumed on May 7th, using the same plan and producing the same results.

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