In the meantime the Irish Government was keen to benefit politically from their volunteers to offset Allied criticism of Irish neutrality. The Irish high commissioner in London, John Dulanty, wrote to the Spectator in March 1944, immediately after the American note controversy, defending his government's stand on neutrality. This was a period of tension between the Allies and Eire, and Winston Churchill had just announced that the country would be cut off from the rest of the world in the interests of security prior to the invasion of Europe.
Dulanty claimed that though Eire had been neutral since the beginning of the war, its policies had not disadvantaged the Allies nor was it hostile to their aims or objectives. As evidence for tthis, Dulanty highlighted the 170,000 Irish working in British war industries and in other sectors of the economy. The implication was that Irish nationals were contributing by their work to the war effort, though this was something the Irish Government refused to acknowledge publicly. The high commissioner also drew attention to the large number of Irish citizens serving with British forces, continuing:
Dulanty claimed that though Eire had been neutral since the beginning of the war, its policies had not disadvantaged the Allies nor was it hostile to their aims or objectives. As evidence for tthis, Dulanty highlighted the 170,000 Irish working in British war industries and in other sectors of the economy. The implication was that Irish nationals were contributing by their work to the war effort, though this was something the Irish Government refused to acknowledge publicly. The high commissioner also drew attention to the large number of Irish citizens serving with British forces, continuing:
No difficulty or hindrance was placed in Eire in the way of those who wished to joint the British Army. The large proportion of Irish who thus volunteered represents a considerable proportion of Eire's population - especially in the military age group - and a good many of these volunteers have, as you know, outstanding achievments to their credit.
Dulanty did not reveal to readers the exact number of Irish men and women in the British forces, but the implication of the letter was that it was quite large. The actual figures have been a source of considerable controversy ever since. The Dominions Office reported in 1946 that Irish sympathizers around the world were claiming that as many as a quarter of a million Irish nationals were in the British armed forces by this time. Indeed such claims got as far as President Roosevelt's office; a telegram arrived to tell him among other matters that 300,000 Irish were fighting for the Allies and this gave Eire the right to participate in the peace conference.
The issue was also both sensitive and controversial for the Commonwealth, because the higher the number of Eire citizens who had volunteered to fight, the less valuable the contribution from other dominions appeared. Churchill always acknowledged the role of the Irish in the British forces, though he was inclined to be sentimental about it. Around the time that Dulanty was writing to the ' Spectator ' the prime minister was announcing restrictions to be imposed on Eire, adding:
The issue was also both sensitive and controversial for the Commonwealth, because the higher the number of Eire citizens who had volunteered to fight, the less valuable the contribution from other dominions appeared. Churchill always acknowledged the role of the Irish in the British forces, though he was inclined to be sentimental about it. Around the time that Dulanty was writing to the ' Spectator ' the prime minister was announcing restrictions to be imposed on Eire, adding:
I need scarcely say how painful it is to us to take measures in view of the large numbers of Irishmen who are fighting so bravely in our armed forces and the many deeds of personal heroism by which they have kept alive the matial honour of the Irish race.
Churchill was careful to distinguish between the ' good ' Irish, who identified with Britain, and the ' bad ' ones, such as de Valera, who at the very least were indifferent to the struggle against Hitler. Yet there was a serious issue for Britain as well as de Valera. Here was a state that was officially neutral yet if the figures could be believed its human
contribution to the war was out of all proportion to the size of its population, when compared with Canada, Australia or South Africa. More politically sensitive was the claim that the number of Volunteers from Eire was proportionally higher than from ' loyalist ' Northern Ireland, questioning the loyalty of the region.
contribution to the war was out of all proportion to the size of its population, when compared with Canada, Australia or South Africa. More politically sensitive was the claim that the number of Volunteers from Eire was proportionally higher than from ' loyalist ' Northern Ireland, questioning the loyalty of the region.
At ' Heads ' de Valera and Winston Churchill
The Unionist government in Northern Ireland was especially sensitive to this charge. In May 1943 Prime Minister Sir Basil Brooke informed Stormont that on the basis of the incomplete information available to him the best estimate for the number of Northern Irish volunteers was 27,600 men and 5,000 women. Just a year later the Belfast Newsletter reported that some 66,000 individuals had joined the British forces in Northern Ireland. The breakdown of these figures is quite interesting: 37,000 northerners and 29,000 from the south. The figure of 37,000 for Northern Ireland is not far off Brooke's total estimate of the previous year ( 33,600 ) plus additional recruitment for the year. If these figures were accurate, there was serious doubt as to the extent to which Northern Ireland identified with the struggle. One of the reasons Churchill returned to the issue of conscription in 1943 was his concern that American troops in Northern Ireland preparing for the invasion of Europe would see the limited extent of involvement by British citizens in the war effort.
The estimates escalated as the war came to an end. In Dublin Maffey came to the conclusion that Frank Gallagher, head of the Government Information Service, and de Valera's confidant, was orchestrating a campaign to present Irish neutrality in the best possible light, especially in the United States. On the 2nd August 1945 Maffey had a bad-tempered exchange with him, during which Gallagher argued that the Allies were wrong to assert that Irish neutrality had affected the outcome of the war. Gallagher promoted the view Irish neutrality had not disadvantaged the British or the United States in any way, indeed that its impact had either been even - handed or positive for the Allies. British officials believed that this Irish campaign during 1945 had been effective. Not long after the war one British diplomat reported that a clergyman preaching at St. Patrick's Cathedral in Dublin at an armistice commemeration had used the figure of 160,000 Volunteers. Even more remarkable from the Irish standpoint was a series of articles written by Randolph Churchill ( Winston's son ) which appeared in the Irish Times in November 1945.
These articles had been commissioned by an American press syndicate to review the position of various countries at the end of the war. When Churchill came to Dublin to research his article, Irish officials went to considerable lengths to convince him that the Irish position in respect of neutrality had been the correct one. This had been so successful that there was some concern that Churchill's enthusiasm for the Irish cause might have been overdone. Frederick Boland, assistant secretary at the Department of External Affairs, told one British official he was worried' that the articles might almost give the impression that Eire's attitude had been tantamount to non-belligerency in our favour and so have an adverse effect on the internal political situation. ' British officials predicted that the articles would be used by Irish diplomats to ' rehabilitate ' Eire in the United States and provide the basis for anti - British campaigners on partition there.
Such attempts had begun as early as 1942. At the end of July that year the United States charge d ' affaires in Dublin reported that Boland had admitted to him that while the Government did not have accurate figures for the number of Irish nationals who had volunteered for the British forces, at least 150,000 individuals had joined up and many of these were women. Boland added that at least 100,000 additional Irish citizens had crossed over to Britain to work in the war industries since 1939. Boland was concerned that at the end of the war as many as 340,000 Irish nationals in Britain would return to Ireland. This, he believed, would cause real problems, but he suggested that the Irish Government was considering a deal with the British: ' as Eire had been helpful to England in their time of difficulty, it was hoped that so England would try to help Eire to reach a solution of her post-war unemployment problem. '
Bt 1943 the propaganda value of the Irish Volunteers had increased considerably. An Irish intelligence report later that year confirms the Irish authorities were convinced that a large number of Irish citizens were in the British forces. This report referred to an article on Ireland that had appeared in the Atlantic Monthly written by Hugh O'Neill
Hencken, who is described as having ' a more informed mind on Irish affairs than the average foreign writer on Irish subjects ' and mentioned specifically his figure of 150,000 as the number of Irish Volunteers in the . . .
The estimates escalated as the war came to an end. In Dublin Maffey came to the conclusion that Frank Gallagher, head of the Government Information Service, and de Valera's confidant, was orchestrating a campaign to present Irish neutrality in the best possible light, especially in the United States. On the 2nd August 1945 Maffey had a bad-tempered exchange with him, during which Gallagher argued that the Allies were wrong to assert that Irish neutrality had affected the outcome of the war. Gallagher promoted the view Irish neutrality had not disadvantaged the British or the United States in any way, indeed that its impact had either been even - handed or positive for the Allies. British officials believed that this Irish campaign during 1945 had been effective. Not long after the war one British diplomat reported that a clergyman preaching at St. Patrick's Cathedral in Dublin at an armistice commemeration had used the figure of 160,000 Volunteers. Even more remarkable from the Irish standpoint was a series of articles written by Randolph Churchill ( Winston's son ) which appeared in the Irish Times in November 1945.
These articles had been commissioned by an American press syndicate to review the position of various countries at the end of the war. When Churchill came to Dublin to research his article, Irish officials went to considerable lengths to convince him that the Irish position in respect of neutrality had been the correct one. This had been so successful that there was some concern that Churchill's enthusiasm for the Irish cause might have been overdone. Frederick Boland, assistant secretary at the Department of External Affairs, told one British official he was worried' that the articles might almost give the impression that Eire's attitude had been tantamount to non-belligerency in our favour and so have an adverse effect on the internal political situation. ' British officials predicted that the articles would be used by Irish diplomats to ' rehabilitate ' Eire in the United States and provide the basis for anti - British campaigners on partition there.
Such attempts had begun as early as 1942. At the end of July that year the United States charge d ' affaires in Dublin reported that Boland had admitted to him that while the Government did not have accurate figures for the number of Irish nationals who had volunteered for the British forces, at least 150,000 individuals had joined up and many of these were women. Boland added that at least 100,000 additional Irish citizens had crossed over to Britain to work in the war industries since 1939. Boland was concerned that at the end of the war as many as 340,000 Irish nationals in Britain would return to Ireland. This, he believed, would cause real problems, but he suggested that the Irish Government was considering a deal with the British: ' as Eire had been helpful to England in their time of difficulty, it was hoped that so England would try to help Eire to reach a solution of her post-war unemployment problem. '
Bt 1943 the propaganda value of the Irish Volunteers had increased considerably. An Irish intelligence report later that year confirms the Irish authorities were convinced that a large number of Irish citizens were in the British forces. This report referred to an article on Ireland that had appeared in the Atlantic Monthly written by Hugh O'Neill
Hencken, who is described as having ' a more informed mind on Irish affairs than the average foreign writer on Irish subjects ' and mentioned specifically his figure of 150,000 as the number of Irish Volunteers in the . . .
