. .British forces. In 1944 the Secretary of the Department of Industry and Commerce in Dublin, Robert Ferguson, who is decribed as ' pro-British and pro-Ally ' cited a figure of 300,000 as the total number of persons of Irish origin in the United Kingdom. He estimated that 150,000 of these were in the British forces and the others in civilian occupations. When an American diplomat challenged Ferguson's figures, he responded that he had statistics for civilian employment in his office and that the figure was probably accurate. However he also defended his figure for Volunteers, though he did not appear to have actual statistics on this. Ferguson readily accepted that the normal calculation for mobilization in wartime would be approximately 10 per cent of the relevant population ( presumably men 21-45 ). He attributed the higher level of recruitment among Irish nationals to the more warlike nature of the Irish, a characteristic they shared with the Scots. Therefore he calculated that a figure of 15 per cent of the population rather than 10 would be more accurate in the case of Scotland and Ireland. He also added to demonstrate the strength of his position that some 12 million pounds in remittances was now being sent back to ireland by those working in Britain every year. By 1945 the figures seem to have inflated even further. An article in
the ' Boston Pilot ' in 1945 written by the Reverend James M. Gillis reported that he had it on the authority of the Irish consul general in New York that between 250,000 and 300,000 Irish nationals had volunteered for the British forces.
Maffey argued that this was all part of an Irish government plan to prepare the ground for an anti-partition campaign in the United States, although most British officials concerned with the issue believed that Irish neutrality during the war had weakened de Valera's appeal in the United States. Accordingly, ' Irish stock ' has never before stood so low in America or among Irish-Americans. Reports indicated that even Irish-Americans disapproved of Irish neutrality and ' the representatives of the Eire government have found it advisable to lie low and wait until the atmosphere improves. ' On this basis and for the foreseeable future, ' We have nothing to fear from Irish attempts to stir up trouble between us and the Americans. ' British officials were dismissive of Irish government attempts to use the Volunteers to redeem their position with the Allies; ' We have nothing to gain from a controversy with the Irish over a delusion as harmless as George IV's belief that he took part in the battle of Waterloo. ' Whatever the British thought, the Irish certainly believed they had much to gain by promoting the importance of the Volunteers and in 1945 and 1946 made considerable efforts to persuade the Allies of the benign nature of its role in the war and the positive contribution made by Ireland to the war effort even though neutral. However, there was also a very un-benign feature to this offensive within the closed world of Irish nationalism.
As the war came to a close, the worst fears of Maffey and of Ulster Unionists seemed to be realized. An editorial in the Irish press entitled ' Crusaders? ' openly challenged Northern Ireland's contribution to the war effort and more elliptically the staus of the war itself. The editorial was written in response to Unionist criticisms that Eire had stood aside ' in the greatest crusade for freedom known to history while Ulster fought in partnership with Great Britain against devilish men and evil things. ' The Irish press instinctively reacted to any slight on Irish neutrality or to any suggestion that de Valera or Fianna Fail might be wrong. Its rather pompous the reply began, ' We, like the Poles, can leave to one side the definition " the greatest crusade for freedom known to history " and went on to challenge whether Northern Ireland had made any reasonable contribution to the war. It claimed that the register of electors in Northern Ireland included a column showing those who had enlisted in the armed forces and gleefully emphasized the total as 29,914, also claiming that the majority of these were Catholics. It condemned Unionist politicians for hypocrisy in demanding conscription when most of their own people did not volunteer for the war. The editorial contrasted this with mobilization in the south, stating that 200,000 men had joined the Irish defence forces when called upon to do so by the state when the country was in danger. Nationalists in Northern Ireland used these figures and the figures for Irish volunteers in the British forces to embarrass the Unionist government, which responded defensively. Of considerable importance however was the evidence that northern Catholics were prepared to volunteer out of proportion to their numbers in the population and in an environment that was especially unsympathetic to them.
Lord Craigavon had promised at the ourbreak of the war that there would be ' no slacking in loyalty. There is no falling off in our determination to place the whole of our resources at the command of the government. ' But at the end of the war nationalists could point out that Unionists were not so loyal when their lives were at risk. One aim of Irish nationalist propaganda was to deflect criticism of the south by suggesting that despite being neutral it had contributed more to the cause than Northern Ireland - an integral part of the United Kingdom, as Unionists never failed to remind them. Unionists were acutely aware during the war of growing criticism of devolved government in Northern Ireland. Moderate Unionist opinion was also alert to this and both within and outside Stormont there was unease at the style of government under Craigavon and his successor and at the failure to prosecute the war with vigour. The issue of numbers volunteering in Northern Ireland and in the south thus took on much more significance than might at first appear.
The Dominions Office sought to counter Irish nationalists assertions but found reliable figures hard to come by. One official commented that ' he could not believe the [ Irish ] figures bore any resemblance to the truth '. The War Office assembled data in June 1942 for those born in Ireland: for the north the figure was 28,287, for the south 23,549. This was for the end of January 1942, and it did not include those serving in the navy or air force. The need for reliable data increased as Frank Gallagher and the Irish diplomatic service circulated what were considered inflated figures to suit their interests. A decision was taken to revisit this issue and determine the exact numbers involved. The Home Office calculated that approximately 100,000 Irish nationals were working in British war industries, confirming Boland's 1942 claim. At the end of 1944 the Dominions office concluded that a ' very approx-imate ' figure might be 40,000 - 70,000 in the armed services. Concern was expressed that British and Dominion public would take offence at the claim that proportionally neutral Ireland had contributed more to the war effort than not only Northern Ireland but the dominions as well. Reliable information for the period between 1941 and the end of 1943 confirmed that some 130,000 Irish nationals had crossed to Britain to work in the war industries, while it was considered likely that 40,000 could be added to this figure for the period between 1939 and 1940 and for 1944.
The total of these figures conforms to Dulanty's estimate of those in war work, but leaves out of consideration how many actually joined the armed forces. There continued to be difficulty obtaining accurate figures for the numbers of those who actually joined up from Ireland.
The 1942 War Office figures were based on place of birth given by individuals, though this was considered by the Dominions Office a ' very unreliable basis for various reasons. ' Machtig now announced that it was time to bring the figures up to date and to gather them from all three services. The secretary of state for the dominions, Lord Cranborne, agreed that the figures should be obtained if possible, but added rather cautiously. ' I should be strongly against publishing them or giving them in the House of Commons, if it can be avoided. There is no value in making public necessarily incomplete or inaccurate statistics. '
The discussion continued to be hampered by incomplete statistics. The new War Office figures did not deviate significantly from those of 1942, and as on previous occasions were based on individuals providing a place of birth. The numbers for Eire in 1944 were 27,840 men and 3,761 women, giving a total of 31,601 in the British Army. The comparable figures for Northern Ireland were 26,579 and 2,152 respectively, a total figure of 28,731. When the figures for 1942 are compared what stands out is that the number born in the south had increased by over 4,000 whereas there had been a decline of some 1,700 in the total for Northern Ireland. This decline was attributed to casualties not being replaced by new recruits from Northern Ireland. However, the percentage of casualties from the south would have been just as high yet their numbers actually increased.
This points to the continuing willingness of individuals from Eire to join the British Army, despite the increasingly hostile attitude of the Irish authorities to them. The composition of those serving also highlights another contrast between North and South. At the end of 1944 there were 3,493 serving officers from the south, whereas the north provided 2,414. In the women's services the south contributed 837 officers and 2,924 other ranks, while the north provided 372 officers and 1,780 other ranks. One reason for this was that there was a considerable amount of work for women in Northern Ireland, whereas in the south not only was work in short supply but there was considerable institutional obstacles to women working. Even though incomplete and inadequate in many respects, the data remains a remarkable testament to the sustained movement of irish citizens into the British armed forces, leading one official to note. ' It will be norn in mind that the population of Eire is three millions against one and a quarter million for Northern Ireland, ' but in a handwritten addition, ' on the other hand Eire is neutral and Northern Ireland is not. ' The figures for the other services proved less encouraging for the Irish case. The Admiralty provided figures based on where an individual lived when he or she joined the service, and concluded that 715 had volunteered for the Royal Navy from the south; the figure for the north was 5,539.
the ' Boston Pilot ' in 1945 written by the Reverend James M. Gillis reported that he had it on the authority of the Irish consul general in New York that between 250,000 and 300,000 Irish nationals had volunteered for the British forces.
Maffey argued that this was all part of an Irish government plan to prepare the ground for an anti-partition campaign in the United States, although most British officials concerned with the issue believed that Irish neutrality during the war had weakened de Valera's appeal in the United States. Accordingly, ' Irish stock ' has never before stood so low in America or among Irish-Americans. Reports indicated that even Irish-Americans disapproved of Irish neutrality and ' the representatives of the Eire government have found it advisable to lie low and wait until the atmosphere improves. ' On this basis and for the foreseeable future, ' We have nothing to fear from Irish attempts to stir up trouble between us and the Americans. ' British officials were dismissive of Irish government attempts to use the Volunteers to redeem their position with the Allies; ' We have nothing to gain from a controversy with the Irish over a delusion as harmless as George IV's belief that he took part in the battle of Waterloo. ' Whatever the British thought, the Irish certainly believed they had much to gain by promoting the importance of the Volunteers and in 1945 and 1946 made considerable efforts to persuade the Allies of the benign nature of its role in the war and the positive contribution made by Ireland to the war effort even though neutral. However, there was also a very un-benign feature to this offensive within the closed world of Irish nationalism.
As the war came to a close, the worst fears of Maffey and of Ulster Unionists seemed to be realized. An editorial in the Irish press entitled ' Crusaders? ' openly challenged Northern Ireland's contribution to the war effort and more elliptically the staus of the war itself. The editorial was written in response to Unionist criticisms that Eire had stood aside ' in the greatest crusade for freedom known to history while Ulster fought in partnership with Great Britain against devilish men and evil things. ' The Irish press instinctively reacted to any slight on Irish neutrality or to any suggestion that de Valera or Fianna Fail might be wrong. Its rather pompous the reply began, ' We, like the Poles, can leave to one side the definition " the greatest crusade for freedom known to history " and went on to challenge whether Northern Ireland had made any reasonable contribution to the war. It claimed that the register of electors in Northern Ireland included a column showing those who had enlisted in the armed forces and gleefully emphasized the total as 29,914, also claiming that the majority of these were Catholics. It condemned Unionist politicians for hypocrisy in demanding conscription when most of their own people did not volunteer for the war. The editorial contrasted this with mobilization in the south, stating that 200,000 men had joined the Irish defence forces when called upon to do so by the state when the country was in danger. Nationalists in Northern Ireland used these figures and the figures for Irish volunteers in the British forces to embarrass the Unionist government, which responded defensively. Of considerable importance however was the evidence that northern Catholics were prepared to volunteer out of proportion to their numbers in the population and in an environment that was especially unsympathetic to them.
Lord Craigavon had promised at the ourbreak of the war that there would be ' no slacking in loyalty. There is no falling off in our determination to place the whole of our resources at the command of the government. ' But at the end of the war nationalists could point out that Unionists were not so loyal when their lives were at risk. One aim of Irish nationalist propaganda was to deflect criticism of the south by suggesting that despite being neutral it had contributed more to the cause than Northern Ireland - an integral part of the United Kingdom, as Unionists never failed to remind them. Unionists were acutely aware during the war of growing criticism of devolved government in Northern Ireland. Moderate Unionist opinion was also alert to this and both within and outside Stormont there was unease at the style of government under Craigavon and his successor and at the failure to prosecute the war with vigour. The issue of numbers volunteering in Northern Ireland and in the south thus took on much more significance than might at first appear.
The Dominions Office sought to counter Irish nationalists assertions but found reliable figures hard to come by. One official commented that ' he could not believe the [ Irish ] figures bore any resemblance to the truth '. The War Office assembled data in June 1942 for those born in Ireland: for the north the figure was 28,287, for the south 23,549. This was for the end of January 1942, and it did not include those serving in the navy or air force. The need for reliable data increased as Frank Gallagher and the Irish diplomatic service circulated what were considered inflated figures to suit their interests. A decision was taken to revisit this issue and determine the exact numbers involved. The Home Office calculated that approximately 100,000 Irish nationals were working in British war industries, confirming Boland's 1942 claim. At the end of 1944 the Dominions office concluded that a ' very approx-imate ' figure might be 40,000 - 70,000 in the armed services. Concern was expressed that British and Dominion public would take offence at the claim that proportionally neutral Ireland had contributed more to the war effort than not only Northern Ireland but the dominions as well. Reliable information for the period between 1941 and the end of 1943 confirmed that some 130,000 Irish nationals had crossed to Britain to work in the war industries, while it was considered likely that 40,000 could be added to this figure for the period between 1939 and 1940 and for 1944.
The total of these figures conforms to Dulanty's estimate of those in war work, but leaves out of consideration how many actually joined the armed forces. There continued to be difficulty obtaining accurate figures for the numbers of those who actually joined up from Ireland.
The 1942 War Office figures were based on place of birth given by individuals, though this was considered by the Dominions Office a ' very unreliable basis for various reasons. ' Machtig now announced that it was time to bring the figures up to date and to gather them from all three services. The secretary of state for the dominions, Lord Cranborne, agreed that the figures should be obtained if possible, but added rather cautiously. ' I should be strongly against publishing them or giving them in the House of Commons, if it can be avoided. There is no value in making public necessarily incomplete or inaccurate statistics. '
The discussion continued to be hampered by incomplete statistics. The new War Office figures did not deviate significantly from those of 1942, and as on previous occasions were based on individuals providing a place of birth. The numbers for Eire in 1944 were 27,840 men and 3,761 women, giving a total of 31,601 in the British Army. The comparable figures for Northern Ireland were 26,579 and 2,152 respectively, a total figure of 28,731. When the figures for 1942 are compared what stands out is that the number born in the south had increased by over 4,000 whereas there had been a decline of some 1,700 in the total for Northern Ireland. This decline was attributed to casualties not being replaced by new recruits from Northern Ireland. However, the percentage of casualties from the south would have been just as high yet their numbers actually increased.
This points to the continuing willingness of individuals from Eire to join the British Army, despite the increasingly hostile attitude of the Irish authorities to them. The composition of those serving also highlights another contrast between North and South. At the end of 1944 there were 3,493 serving officers from the south, whereas the north provided 2,414. In the women's services the south contributed 837 officers and 2,924 other ranks, while the north provided 372 officers and 1,780 other ranks. One reason for this was that there was a considerable amount of work for women in Northern Ireland, whereas in the south not only was work in short supply but there was considerable institutional obstacles to women working. Even though incomplete and inadequate in many respects, the data remains a remarkable testament to the sustained movement of irish citizens into the British armed forces, leading one official to note. ' It will be norn in mind that the population of Eire is three millions against one and a quarter million for Northern Ireland, ' but in a handwritten addition, ' on the other hand Eire is neutral and Northern Ireland is not. ' The figures for the other services proved less encouraging for the Irish case. The Admiralty provided figures based on where an individual lived when he or she joined the service, and concluded that 715 had volunteered for the Royal Navy from the south; the figure for the north was 5,539.
