The Admiralty admitted that these figures were limited but argued that more detailed information could only be obtained if advanced statistical machines were used and these were required for the war effort. The Air Ministry was more forthcoming providing RAF figures of 12,200 for Northern Ireland and 11,050 for Eire. The totals for all men and women in the army and air force thus come to 41,950 for Eire and 40,660 for Northern Ireland. These figures are based on the same criteria : place of birth as provided when joining up. As the Admiralty figures did not follow this method, its data can be considered unsatisfactory. The Dominions Office concluded that the total for the navy for all of Ireland was no more than 6,000 but in contrast to the figures provided by the Admiralty thought that this should be divided equally between the two parts of the Island. The Dominions Office remained unsure how to proceed with the matter, though it was decided to work through the Ministry of Information to deflate the Irish numbers being circulated. Concern was expressed that in the absence of of reliable figures for the navy ' it would not be right to use them as the basis of an official statement. ' It was also decided that Britain could gain little from publication, but that informal circulation might temper the Irish case. This was thought an appropriate task for the Ministry of Information, which was authorized to confirm that volunteers from Eire numbered no more than 50,000 and that this was a generous estimate. The intention was to counter Irish exaggeration. Maffey, however, opposed any off-the-record release of data on the ground that the numbers were unreliable and in the absence of any direct benefit to Britain in doing so. Machtig wrote to Cranborne after the discussion with Maffey admitting that the figures were not ' firm ' and publicity could generate a serious challenge to their reliability. There was a real danger, he added, that more harm than good would be done in the circumstances. Maffey also feared that those unsympathetic to Eire in the United Kingdom would highlight the large numbers of deserters from the Irish forces now in the British military and that this would have an unfortunate effect on Ireland. In addition Maffey believed that the Irish government would not ' directly or indirectly, claim credit for the number of Volunteers serving with the forces. ' Cranborne accepted the strength of this argument, fearing that Irsih sympathizers, such as Sir Hubert Gough would challenge any official figures, even though they might be ' approximately correct . ' Cranborne would have liked to ' pick the bubble of Irish propaganda, ' but recognised that this might rebound on them and not achieve the political objective desired. British officials were mistaken if they hoped to keep the issue from the public eye. Both sympathizers and critics of Ireland were quick to use the Volunteer issue to promote specific views on the situation. One Soviet expert on the British Empire cited the figures approvingly to demonstrate that the Irish were indeed anti-fascist despite the official position of the government. In contrast, the author, St John Ervine challenged Sir Hubert Gough's figures on the numbers volunteering during the war, a challenge actually endorsed by David Gray. In Northern Ireland Unionists and Nationalists argued over the merits of Irish neutrality and the number of Volunteers for their own ideological ends. When the future president of the United States John F. Kennedy, visited Dublin in July 1945 he found the higher figures widely cited by those he met. He was told that approximately 250,000 Irish nationals had travelled to Britain during the war.